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I.  Introduction 
In recent years, a series of bills have been introduced in various states 
here in the United States which seek to protect states from the perceived 
threat that “Islamic Shariah law” is “creeping” into our nation through the 
American court system.1  These bills, aimed at preventing the “creeping 
threat”2 of “Islamic Shariah law,”3 are generally referred to as “anti-Shariah 
bills.”4 
These so-called “anti-Shariah” bills can be divided into two broad 
categories.  The first category consists of bills, which are overtly 
discriminatory on their face, and the second category consists of bills, 
which contain no explicit references to “Shariah law” in their text and are, 
therefore, “facially neutral.”  After an overtly discriminatory “anti-Shariah” 
bill in Oklahoma was ruled unconstitutional by federal courts,5 the 
proponents of “anti-Shariah” legislation switched political strategies in 
favor of facially neutral bills which contained no explicit references to 
“Shariah law.”6  The model legislation for this new “facially neutral” 
                                                                                                     
 1. See American Public Policy Alliance, American Laws for American Courts, 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2013) (“Unfortunately, increasingly, . . . Shariah law principles[ ] are finding their 
way into US court cases.”). 
 2. Christian Broadcast Network, Report: U.S. Ignoring Creeping Threat from Sharia 
Law (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2010/September/Report-US-
Ignoring-Creeping-Threat-from-Sharia-Law/; see also Matt Duss, Creeping Sharia ‘Team B’ 
Report Presented to Congress, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 15 2012, 4:10 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2010/09/15/176274/creeping-sharia-team-b-report-
presented-to-congress/ (quoting U.S. House Representative Trent Franks as saying “It’s clear 
that the creeping threat of [S]haria poses a threat to the Constitution”). 
 3. See American Public Policy Alliance, supra note 1 (explaining the need “to protect 
American citizens[ ]. . . [from] Islamic Shariah Law”). 
 4. Reference the American Public Policy Alliance (APPA) web page for references 
to “creeping threat” and “Islamic Shariah law” and reference CAIR-National materials, or 
general media materials, for their common usage of the phrase “anti-Shariah.” 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
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strategy goes by the name “American Laws for American Courts” 7 and is 
more commonly known by the acronym ALAC.8 
As these new facially neutral ALAC bills have been passed into law in 
several states,9 there has been no ensuing litigation that has challenged the 
constitutionality of these new facially neutral bills.  Both proponents of 
“anti-Shariah” legislation, as well as adversaries, seem to have accepted the 
legal principle that these facially neutral ALAC bills are somehow immune 
from constitutional scrutiny.10  The proponents of the new facially neutral 
ALAC bills have expressed a belief that the language contained in the plain 
text of these bills is the legally relevant inquiry, and a bill that contains no 
explicit references to “Shariah law” is therefore immune from constitutional 
scrutiny.11  The litigants who opposed “anti-Shariah” legislation in 
Oklahoma, based upon the arguments asserted in that litigation, have 
seemingly taken the position that the crucial legal inquiry is whether 
particular “anti-Shariah” legislation has a detrimental effect upon 
individuals’ ability to practice their faith, in accordance with “Shariah” 
principles, in the relevant jurisdiction.12  The unstated premise underlying 
this articulated legal argument is that because facially neutral ALAC bills 
do not specifically reference “Shariah,” these bills have no detrimental 
effect upon individuals’ ability to practice their faith in accordance with 
“Shariah,” and because the bills do not effect individuals’ ability to practice 
their faith, the bills are therefore immune from constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                                                                     
 7. See supra note 1 (“By promoting American Laws for American Courts, we are 
preserving individual liberties and freedoms . . . .”). 
 8. See Louis Palme, CAIR-FAIL: Analysis of CAIR’s 2013 Report on Islamophobia in 
the U.S., THE COUNTER JIHAD REPORT (Sept. 22, 2013), http://counterjihadreport.com/ 
tag/alac/ (noting that anti-Islam legislation is better known as “American Laws for American 
Courts”). 
 9. See Council on American-Islamic Relations, A Brief Overview of the 
Pervasiveness of Anti-Islamic Legislation (Jan. 2013), https://www.cair.com/images/pdf/ 
Pervasiveness-of-anti-Islam-legislation.pdf (providing succinct data on the status of ALAC, 
or other “anti-Shariah” bills, introduced in state legislatures nationally); see also Bill 
Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Signed into Law in Kansas, Sent to 
Study Committee in New Hampshire, Still Technically Alive in MI, NC, PA, & SC, GAVEL TO 
GAVEL (May 29, 2012), http://gavelto gavel.us/site/2012/05/29/bans-on-court-use-of-
shariainternational-law-signed-into-law-in-kansas-sent-to-study-committee-in-new-
hampshire-still-technically-alive-in-mi-nc-pa-sc/ (detailing the few states that have 
introduced bills to ban the use of Sharia law in their courts). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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This article challenges both of these legal theories and boldly asserts 
that the new facially neutral ALAC bills remain unconstitutional for the 
exact same reasons that the overtly discriminatory Oklahoma legislation 
was unconstitutional.  In so doing, this article takes a legal position contrary 
to the positions held by both parties involved in the seminal “anti-Shariah” 
case involving the “Save Our State Amendment” in Oklahoma (“SOS 
Amendment”). 
This article will demonstrate that the Oklahoma SOS Amendment was 
found to be unconstitutional primarily because it was enacted with the 
intent to politically marginalize a subset of Americans, based upon religious 
affiliation,13 in violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  Notably, the author of this article asserts that the tangible 
effects of the SOS Amendment upon the lead plaintiff’s ability to practice 
his faith were wholly irrelevant, as a legal matter, to the courts’ analysis of 
the constitutionality of the amendment.  Furthermore, this article asserts 
that the language contained in the plain text of the bills is legally irrelevant 
if there is other evidence of intent to marginalize the affected community. 
This article is divided into two broad categories.  To provide a factual 
and contextual background, Part II of this article will describe the 
phenomenon of “anti-Shariah” bills by defining the term “anti-Shariah,” 
documenting the prevalence of “anti-Shariah” bills, and distinguishing 
between “overtly discriminatory” bills and “facially neutral” bills.  Part II 
will also document the litigation concerning the Oklahoma SOS 
Amendment and the ensuing shift from overtly discriminatory bills to 
facially neutral bills, focusing particularly on the American Laws for 
American Courts (“ALAC”) model legislation and the ALAC bill 
introduced in Pennsylvania.  Following this factual background, Part III of 
this article will focus upon legal analysis of these bills pursuant to the 
United States Constitution.  To that end, Part III will more carefully 
examine the Oklahoma litigation, the arguments asserted therein, and the 
courts’ ultimate rulings.  Part III will also apply the courts’ rulings in the 
Oklahoma litigation to the facially neutral ALAC legislation, using the 
Pennsylvania ALAC bill as an example, and will ultimately conclude that 
these rulings are as applicable to ALAC legislation as to overtly 
discriminatory “anti-Shariah” legislation.  In so doing, Part III will 
demonstrate that the legal theories advanced by both the proponents of the 
                                                                                                     
 13. “Religious affiliation,” as referenced herein, is separate and distinct from religious 
practice.  It is my argument that facially neutral “anti-Shariah” legislation does not merely 
affect persons who actively practice their faith, but also equally impacts all Americans with 
a Muslim identity. 
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facially neutral ALAC legislation and the plaintiff in the Oklahoma 
litigation rely upon factors that are legally irrelevant.  Finally, Part IV will 
conclude by asserting that the crucial legal inquiry, in analyzing the 
constitutionality of facially neutral ALAC legislation, is the intent to 
politically marginalize persons affiliated with a particular faith or faiths.  
The effect of the legislation upon individuals’ ability to engage in religious 
practices is legally irrelevant, and the neutrality of the language used in the 
statute is legally irrelevant, provided that there is other evidence of intent to 
marginalize. 
II.  Overview of “Anti-Shariah” Bills and the Strategic Shift toward the 
“Facially Neutral” American Laws for American Courts (ALAC) Model 
A.  Overview of “Anti-Shariah” Bills and Legislation 
This article will use the phrase “anti-Shariah bills” or “anti-Shariah 
legislation” as this is the nomenclature most frequently used to describe 
such bills.14  The term “anti-Shariah bill(s)” will be used to describe 
proposed legislation, or to describe the phenomenon generally; whereas the 
term “anti-Shariah legislation” will be used to describe a particular bill that 
has been passed into law, such as the Oklahoma SOS Amendment.  
Notably, the term “anti-Shariah” will remain in quotation marks to denote 
the author’s discomfort with this term.  The Council on American-Islamic 
Relations (CAIR), as a national organization, has adopted the phrase “anti-
Islam bills” or “anti-Islam legislation”15 in an effort to describe these bills 
as attacking an entire religion, Islam, rather than attacking a particular 
subset of that religion as expressed in a body of law, code of religious 
conduct, or set of religious beliefs.  To a certain degree, the Philadelphia 
Office of CAIR has used the phrase “anti-Muslim bills” or “anti-Muslim 
                                                                                                     
 14. See Alicia Gay, ACLU Lens: The Truth Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement, 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 1, 2011, 2:52 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
national-security-religion-belief/aclu-lens-truth-behind-anti-sharia-movement (discussing, 
and referring to the “anti-Sharia” movement); but see Council on American-Islamic 
Relations, supra note 9, at 1 (alternately referring to such legislation as “anti-Islam” bills); 
Council on American-Islamic Relations, Securing Religious Liberty Handbook (Feb. 2012) 
http://www.cair.com/images/pdf/CAIR-Securing-Religious-Liberty-Handbook.pdf 
(alternately referring to such legislation as “anti-Muslim” bills).  The author of this article 
was one of the CAIR employees who suggested that the term “anti-Muslim” most accurately 
describes this legislation. 
 15. CAIR formally began using the term “anti-Islam” in January 2013. 
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legislation”16 to reflect the fact that I, as the author of this article, believe 
that these bills are targeted at a particular subset of the American people 
and therefore, are designed to target a people, not an obscure set of 
religious laws or any set of religious beliefs.  Nonetheless, as the author of 
this article, I maintain  my position regarding the true target of the so-called 
“anti-Shariah bills,” I will use the phrase “anti-Shariah” throughout this 
article—always in quotation marks—to reflect the most commonly used 
description of these bills. 
“Anti-Shariah” bills are an incredibly common phenomenon in the 
United States today.  As of the end of 2012, seventy-eight (78) such bills 
had been introduced in thirty-one (31) states.17  Furthermore, six (6) states 
had passed such bills into law: Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, and Tennessee.18  At the time I became involved in 
challenging such legislation, in late 2011, more than fifty (50) bills had 
been introduced in twenty-three (23) states.19  Furthermore, four (4) states 
had passed such bills into law (Kansas and South Dakota had not yet passed 
“anti-Shariah” bills into law).20 
 B.  The Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment, Litigation, and Outcome 
An example of an overtly discriminatory “anti-Shariah” bill is 
Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment.21  This amendment to the 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Council on American-Islamic Relations, What Happens Without CAIR, 
http://pa.cair.com/news/what-happens-without-cair/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (stating that, 
at the time the article was written, North Carolina passed “anti-Muslim” legislation). 
 17. See Council on American-Islamic Relations, supra note 9, at 1 (“In 2011 and 
2012, 78 bills or amendments aimed at interfering with Islamic religious practices or 
vilifying Islam were considered in 31 states and the U.S. Congress.”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Memorandum from the Council on American-Islamic Relations Pa., Phila. 
Office to the Pa. Gen. Assemb., H.R., Judiciary Comm. 3 (Jan. 27. 2012), available at 
http://pa.cair.com/files/cr/Memo%20in%20opposition%20to%20HB%202029.pdf (citing the 
prevalence of ALAC bills and legislation in a memorandum opposing a similar bill in the 
Pennsylvania legislature). 
 20. Id.  The original memorandum incorrectly asserted that Texas had passed an “anti-
Shariah” bill into law prior to the submission of that memorandum.  That was inaccurate.  At 
the conclusion of 2012, prior to the symposium presentation at which this material was first 
presented, Texas had not passed an “anti-Shariah” bill into law). 
 21. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012) (“On May 25, 2010, the 
Oklahoma House of Representatives and Senate House passed House Joint Resolution 1056 
(“HJR 1056”) [which] directed ‘the Secretary of State to refer to the people for their 
approval or rejection a proposed amendment to Section 1 of Article VII of the [Oklahoma] 
Constitution . . . [known as] the Save Our State Amendment.’”).   
THE NEW FACIALLY NEUTRAL “ANTI-SHARIAH” BILLS 31 
Oklahoma constitution was posed directly to the voters of that state through 
a ballot initiative known as “State Question 755.”22 Initially, the Oklahoma 
House of Representatives and Senate passed a joint resolution directing the 
Secretary of State to refer to the people of Oklahoma a proposed 
amendment to be titled the “Save Our State Amendment” (referred to 
herein as the “SOS amendment”).23  The explicit language of the proposed 
SOS Amendment would add to the Oklahoma constitution two explicit 
references to “Sharia Law.”24  In the first instance, the amendment indicated 
that Oklahoma courts may apply the law “of another state of the United 
States provided [that] the law of the other state does not include Sharia 
Law, [sic.] in making judicial decisions.”25  In the second instance, the 
amendment explicitly stated that “the courts shall not consider . . . Sharia 
Law.”26  In addition to these explicit references to “Sharia Law,” the 
Oklahoma Attorney General added a definition of “Sharia Law” which 
demonstrated a more overt intention of targeting Islam and Muslims: 
“Sharia Law is Islamic law [sic.].  It is based on two principal sources, the 
Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.”27 
In addition to these overt references to “Sharia Law” in the plain text 
of the SOS Amendment, there was also non-textual evidence of an anti-
Muslim discriminatory intent.  As noted in the federal district court decision 
enjoining the SOS Amendment, one of the authors of the amendment had 
publicly acknowledged that the purpose of the amendment was to target 
“Shariah Law.”28  More precisely, the amendment was proposed “to 
establish a legal impediment against the ‘looming threat’ of Sharia Law in 
the United States.”29  More disturbingly, however, the same sponsor also 
indicated that the bill was designed to target “Shariah Law” in an effort to 
target American Muslims, whose “principles,” he believed, were contrary to 
the “Judeo-Christian” principles upon which America was founded.30 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 1118. 
 23. Id. at 1117. 
 24. Id. at 1118. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir 2012). 
 28. Awad v. Ziriax, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11960, at 8 (W.D. Okla. 2010).  
 29  Id. at 9. 
 30. See id. at 8–9 (“Specifically, plaintiff asserts that State Question 755’s origins 
establish that the amendment’s actual purpose is to disapprove of plaintiff's faith. In support, 
plaintiff cites to one of the authors of State Question 755, Representative Rex Duncan’s, 
statement that ‘America was founded on Judeo-Christian principles’ and the amendment's 
purpose was to ensure that Oklahoma's courts are not used to ‘undermine those founding 
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After the SOS Amendment was approved by the voters of the State of 
Oklahoma, but before the bill went into effect, a lawsuit was filed 
challenging its validity on constitutional grounds.31 More specifically, an 
Oklahoma Muslim, Muneer Awad, who at the time was employed as the 
Executive Director of the Oklahoma chapter of the Council on American-
Islamic Relations, filed a lawsuit alleging that the SOS Amendment 
violated his constitutional rights under the Establishment Clause and Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.32  This lawsuit was ultimately 
successful.  A federal district court judge ruled in Mr. Awad’s favor on 
CAIR initiated litigation on November 29, 2010,33 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed on January 10, 2012,34 and the 
federal district court ultimately granted a motion for summary judgment in 
Mr. Awad’s favor on August 15, 2013.35 
 C.  The After-Effects of Oklahoma: The New “Facially Neutral” American 
Laws for American Courts Model 
The ALAC model legislation was created as a direct result of the 
legislation involving the Oklahoma SOS Amendment.  In fact, the author of 
the ALAC model legislation, Brooklyn-based attorney David Yerushalmi,36 
has explained that model ALAC legislation “differ[s] from the failed 
Oklahoma amendment in one key way: They don’t mention Sharia.”37  
Moreover, he opined, at the time that the model legislation was created and 
being introduced to the public that, because the bills are “facially neutral,” 
i.e., contain no explicit references to “Sharia,” they can “avoid[ ] the sticky 
problems of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”38  The American Public 
                                                                                                     
principles,’ and Representative Duncan's further statement that the purpose of the measure 
was to establish a legal impediment against the ‘looming threat’ of Sharia Law in the United 
States.”). 
 31. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (challenging the validity of the 
bill on constitutional grounds). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 35. Awad v. Ziriax, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115397 (W.D. Okla. 2013). 
 36. See Memorandum from the Council on American-Islamic Relations Pa., supra 
note 19 (noting that although Yerushalmi has not always openly acknowledged that he is the 
author (or primary author) of the ALAC legislation, he is widely believed to be the author 
and he openly acknowledges his interest in the success of ALAC).  
 37. Id. at Ex. G (citing Tim Murphy, Meet the White Supremacist Leading the GOP’s 
Anti-Sharia Crusade (published Mar. 2, 2011)). 
 38. Id. 
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Policy Alliance (APPA),39 the organization created by Yerushalmi and 
others to promote the ALAC model legislation, has continued to assert that 
the facial neutrality of ALAC renders these bills immune from 
constitutional scrutiny.  In a statement issued on August 19, 2013, the 
APPA reported the successful passage of an ALAC bill in Oklahoma on 
that same date in the following manner: “Fortunately, there is an effective 
and constitutional alternative to measures such as SQ755[,] and . . . [t]hat 
law is called American laws for American Courts (ALAC).”40  As of the 
date of the submission of this article for publication, there have been no 
court rulings regarding the constitutionality of the new ALAC legislation in 
Oklahoma. 
Though the APPA, and other ALAC supporters, have publicly praised 
the facial neutrality of the model legislation, none has denied that ALAC’s 
primary purpose is to marginalize Islam and Muslims.  The APPA has 
asserted that the ALAC model legislation was created specifically to guard 
against “the infiltration and incursion of foreign laws and foreign legal 
doctrines, especially Islamic Shariah Law.”41  In addition to its explicit 
reference to the word “Islamic,” the APPA has further acknowledge its 
intent to target Islam and Muslims, and no other Abrahamic faiths and their 
adherents by clarifying that the model ALAC legislation does not interfere 
with “Jewish law or Catholic Canon Law” because these religious laws do 
                                                                                                     
 39. The APPA, the official creators and promoters of ALAC legislation, is an 
intriguing organization.  As one report notes:  “The American Public Policy Alliance is 
responsible for American Laws for American Courts, the anti-Islam template legislation that 
has been considered by lawmakers across the nation.  While the organization has a 
professional-looking website, it’s Washington, DC [sic] address is a UPS Store.”  See 
Legislating Fear:  Islamophobia and its Impact in the United States, Council on American-
Islamic Relations 2013 Report, at p.20.  Notably, as of the date this article was submitted for 
publication, the APPA’s website lists no staff members and no members of a Board of 
Directors.  Despite these presumptive limitations, however, the APPA has created model 
legislation which has been introduced in state legislatures nationwide and has been signed 
into law in several states.  In other words, though the 2013 Report, supra, seeks to discredit 
the APPA, the APPA has arguably been more successful in its advocacy on this issue then 
those who oppose it (including the authors of the 2013 Report). 
 40. See ALAC Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign Law, APPA, Aug. 19, 
2013 (referring to an article in American Thinker which analyzed the weaknesses of the SOS 
Amendment and which is publicly available at  http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/09/ 
american_laws_for_american_courts.html), available at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/ 
category/american-laws-for-american-courts.  
 41. Memorandum in Opposition, Ex. C (citing American Laws for American Courts, 
public policy alliance).  
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not pose the same threat to constitutional rights or public policy as “Islamic 
Shariah Law.”42 
The nativist rhetoric that seems to underlie ALAC is not surprising in 
light of statements reportedly made by the model legislation’s purported 
author, David Yerushalmi. The New York Times has reported that the author 
of the ALAC model legislation has been quoted as saying that “most of the 
fundamental differences between the races are genetic” and that “there’s a 
reason the founding fathers did not give women or black slaves the right to 
vote.”43  The Anti-Defamation League has quoted him as saying that 
African Americans are a “relatively murderous race killing itself.”44  He has 
also been quoted as saying that Jews “destroy their host nations like a fatal 
parasite” and that “America was the handiwork of faithful Christians, 
mostly men, and almost entirely white.”45 
Despite this, rather alarming, history of ALAC, I first became aware of 
the “anti-Shariah” movement in November 2011 when ALAC legislation 
was introduced in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s General 
Assembly.46  At the time, the Oklahoma SOS Amendment had been 
defeated at the federal district court level but the appellate court had not yet 
issued a ruling on appeal.  “Anti-Shariah” bills had been passed in four (4) 
states, and the new “facially neutral” ALAC legislation was relatively new. 
The fact that ALAC legislation was introduced in Pennsylvania is 
interesting in light of Pennsylvania’s history of religious plurality.  The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was established as William Penn’s “Holy 
Experiment” after he came into possession of the territory in 1681.  When 
the Pennsylvania constitution was drafted in 1776, it included both a Free 
Exercise Clause and an Establishment Clause in order to protect its citizens’ 
religious liberty.  The religion of Islam, which “anti-Shariah” legislation 
aims to target, was specifically discussed during debates regarding the 
precise language of these religious clauses.  In that particular debate, the 
appropriately named “Constitutionalists,” who favored religious freedom 
and pluralism, eventually won the debate against the equally aptly named 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at Ex. D. 
 43. Id. at Ex. E (citing Andrea Elliot, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011). 
 44. Id. at Ex. F, (citing David Yerushalmi: A Driving Force Behind Anti-Sharia Efforts 
in the U.S., Anti-Defamation League, Jan. 13, 2012). 
 45. Id. at Ex. G. 
 46. The bill, known as House Bill 2029, was actually introduced on June 14, 2011, 
with little public awareness of its existence.  The bill came to my attention when it was 
referred to committee, specifically the House Judiciary Committee, on November 18, 2011. 
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“Anticonstitutionalists,” who advocated for governmental reliance only 
upon Protestant values.  As an enduring sign of its dedication to religious 
pluralism, Pennsylvania continues to have large populations of minority 
religions that are much less frequently found living in cohesive 
communities in other parts of the country.  Well-known examples of this 
phenomenon include the Amish and the Quakers, but there are also less 
well-known religious communities, an example of which can be seen at the 
“Ephrata Cloisters,” which advertise themselves as the “home of the 
wooden pillow.”  Minority faiths have even affected generally applicable 
laws in Pennsylvania.  For example, Pennsylvania marriage law allows for 
what is known as “self-executing” marriage licenses to accommodate the 
Quaker faith.  In light of this history of religious pluralism, the introduction 
of ALAC legislation in Pennsylvania raised concerns among 
Pennsylvanians that, if an ALAC bill can pass in Pennsylvania, then it can 
pass anywhere. 
The ALAC bill, which was introduced in Pennsylvania, House Bill 
2029 (HB 2029), was titled “American and Pennsylvania Laws for 
Pennsylvania Courts” and closely followed the “facially neutral” mandate 
of the APPA and its model ALAC legislation.47  Though the bill was, in 
fact, “facially neutral,” the political context surrounding the bill made it 
evident that the bill was designed to marginalize Islam and Muslims. 
The strongest evidence that HB 2029 was designed to target Muslims, 
and Pennsylvanians associated with the Islamic faith, is the bill’s original 
co-sponsorship memorandum entitled “American and Pennsylvania Laws 
for Pennsylvania Courts—Shariah Law,” thereby plainly indicating, in its 
title no less, the bill’s primary purpose of targeting “Shariah law”—not all 
foreign laws.48  The memo continued to mention “Shariah law” multiple 
times throughout its text terms, as something which is “foreign,” ominous, 
and menacing.49  Copying, almost verbatim, the language used by the 
APPA in describing the model ALAC legislation, the memo warns that 
“[u]nfortunately, increasingly, foreign laws and legal doctrines—including 
and especially Shariah law—are finding their way into U.S. court cases.”50 
Most alarmingly, this co-sponsorship memo singles out Islam as the target 
of HB 2029 and specifically warns of “Shariah law, which is inherently 
                                                                                                     
 47. The bill’s sponsor acknowledged that HB 2029 was based upon the model ALAC 
legislation proposed by the APPA.  See Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 36, at 3. 
 48. Id at Ex. I. 
 49. Id. 
 50.  Id. at Ex. C. 
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hostile to our constitutional liberties.”51  Because “Shariah” is a common 
reference to the Islamic faith, and its adherents, the allegation that 
“Shariah” is “inherently hostile to our constitutional liberties” should be 
understood as an assertion that the bill’s sponsor is asserting a belief that 
both the Islamic faith and its adherents are inherently “hostile” to the 
United States Constitution and the cultural values reflected therein.   
Perhaps admonished by the APPA, and other creators of the model 
ALAC legislation, the bill’s sponsor appeared to have realized the 
constitutional problems created by blatant references to “Shariah law” and 
circulated a second co-sponsorship memorandum regarding HB 2029 on 
October 18, 2011.52  This second memorandum is a more sanitized version 
of her original co-sponsorship memorandum and makes no explicit 
references to “Shariah law.”53  The omission of explicit references to Islam, 
Muslims, or “Shariah,” in the second memorandum did not negate the 
earlier evidence of intent to target Islam, Muslims, and “Shariah” expressed 
in the previous memo. 
In addition to the co-sponsorship memoranda, there was other 
evidence of the APPA’s intent to target Muslims through its ALAC 
legislation in Pennsylvania.  First, the plain text of the bill created a carve-
out exception for businesses so that “foreign law” could still be applied to 
business entities in certain circumstances.  This carve-out exception, once 
again, demonstrated that HB 2029 was not designed to target all foreign 
law, just “Islamic Sharia law.”  The second example is the public hearing 
on the bill, which was scheduled for December 2012 when there were no 
remaining voting days in the legislative session.  Without any remaining 
voting days scheduled before the bill was scheduled to expire, the only 
plausible explanation for the public hearings is that the hearings were 
planned to serve as a forum, taking place within a state governmental 
institution, in which Muslims were to be publicly portrayed as “inherently 
hostile to our constitutional liberties.”  Finally, it is plausible that the non-
binding “Year of the Bible Resolution,”54 which was passed by a 
unanimous vote in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in January 
2012, was motivated, in some extent, by the then-current political history 
                                                                                                     
 51.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at Ex. J. 
 53.  See Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 36, at Ex. J. 
 54. See H.R. 535, 196th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012), available at http:// 
www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2011
&sessInd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=R&billNbr=0535&pn=2983 (passing the Resolution by 
unanimous vote). 
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surrounding the anti-Shariah bills in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania.  
Coincidentally, or not, also in January 2012, the Tenth Circuit issued its 
ruling against the SOS Amendment in Oklahoma and, in its opinion, opined 
that the SOS Amendment would have passed constitutional scrutiny of 
ripeness grounds if it had been passed by the Oklahoma legislature as a 
non-binding resolution.55 
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania resolution expired as an operation of law 
when the governor did not sign it into law before the end of the legislative 
session. 
III. Constitutional Analysis of “Anti-Shariah” Legislation 
A.  Overview of Relevant Constitutional Law 
To understand how and why “anti-Shariah” bills, including ALAC, 
violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment, it is necessary to 
review the particular case law that is most relevant to a “facially neutral” 
“anti-Shariah” bill.  As described in further detail below, I believe that the 
model ALAC legislation violates the Establishment Clause because it 
constitutes a government disapproval of Islam and therefore fails the 
“endorsement test.”  I further believe that the bills’ facial neutrality are 
insufficient to confer constitutionality because there is such overwhelming 
extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent that ALAC bills cannot be 
understood to be a “neutral law of general applicability” that would avoid 
implication of the Free Exercise Clause. 
The Supreme Court has determined that a government action violates 
the Establishment Clause of the federal constitution if it has either the 
intended purpose or the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.56  
Moreover, Justice O’Connor describes an analytic framework for applying 
the “Lemon test” which has become known as the “endorsement test.”57  
Pursuant to this “endorsement test,” a government action will fail the 
“Lemon test” if that action conveys a message of government endorsement 
or disapproval of a particular religion.58  In her articulation of the 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (discussing the viability of the 
bill if it were non-binding). 
 56. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (describing the “excessive 
entanglement” between government and religion). 
 57. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(explaining the endorsement test for applying the Lemon test). 
 58. Id. at 688. 
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“endorsement test,” Justice O’Connor articulates the reason why 
government approval or disapproval violates the Establishment Clause.  
According to Justice O’Connor, government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion results in political alienation of adherents of the disfavored faith, 
and it is this political alienation, which is not permitted by the federal 
Establishment Clause.  As stated by Justice O’Connor: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence 
to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political 
community.  Government can run afoul of [the Establishment Clause] in 
two principal ways…. The second and more direct infringement is 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends 
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.  
Disapproval sends the opposite message.59 
Justice O’Connor’s clarification, which would later become known as 
the “endorsement test,” prohibits governmental “disapproval” of religion 
because of the effect that such government disapproval has upon the 
political standing of both adherents and “nonadherents” of a particular 
religion.  Pursuant to O’Connor’s analysis, the danger of “anti-Shariah” 
bills generally, ALAC bills in particular, and HB 2029 as an individual 
example is that these bills create an official government disapproval of a 
particular religion, Islam, which sends a message that the identified 
“adherents” of the Islamic religion, Muslims, are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community. 
The proponents of ALAC, in arguing the undefeatable merits of 
“facially neutral” legislation, have seemingly (and wrongfully) assumed 
that a “facially neutral” bill is, by definition, a “neutral law of general 
applicability.” However, whereas the latter is immune from Free Exercise 
Clause scrutiny, the Supreme Court has clarified that the former is not.60  In 
determining whether legislation is a “neutral law of general applicability,” 
the Court has specifically indicated that courts may consider all evidence of 
discriminatory intent, including extrinsic evidence, and is not limited to the 
plain text of the legislation itself: 
We reject the contention advanced by the city that our inquiry must end 
with the text of the laws at issue.  Facial neutrality is not determinative.  
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 687–88 (emphasis added). 
 60. See Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 560 (1993) (explaining that 
facially neutral legislation may still be subject to Free Exercise Clause scrutiny). 
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The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends 
beyond facial discrimination.  The Clause “forbids subtle departures 
from neutrality” and “covert suppression of particular religious 
beliefs.”  Official action that targets conduct for distinctive treatment 
cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial 
neutrality.  The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental 
hostility which is masked as well as overt.61 
Pursuant to this analysis, ALAC’s facial neutrality will not render 
these bills immune from constitutional scrutiny if there is extrinsic evidence 
of intent to target Islam and Muslims. 
The Free Exercise Clause is relevant to analysis of ALAC bills for 
another reason as well.  Contrary to the arguments asserted by the 
proponents of ALAC legislation, and contrary to the stated purpose of HB 
2029, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that religion cannot 
be used as an excuse to circumvent generally applicable laws.  For example, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be 
used to circumvent generally applicable criminal laws relating to bigamy62 
and ingestion of controlled substances.63  The Free Exercise Clause also 
cannot be used to circumvent laws designed for the protection of children,64 
the regulation of business,65 the payment of taxes,66 and issues involving 
national security and the regulation of the military.67  Given the plentitude 
of these cases, it is undisputable that, under existing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, no law (foreign or otherwise) which violates the constitution 
can be upheld by any court in the United States.  Therefore, the ALAC 
laws, which seek to prevent the same harm already prevented by a body of 
law originating in 1878, cannot be intended to prevent the same harm.  
Instead, the laws exist for one primary purpose:  to label American Muslims 
                                                                                                     
 61. See id. at 534 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 62. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–67 (1878) (disallowing the use of 
the Free Exercise Clause to defend against the criminal charge of bigamy). 
 63. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889–90 (1990) (holding that “because 
respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that 
prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny 
respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from the use of the 
drug”). 
 64. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (affirming appellant’s 
conviction for violating the state child labor laws for engaging her child in street preaching). 
 65. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (relating to Sunday closing laws). 
 66. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 253 (1982) (relating to Social Security taxes). 
 67. See Gilette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (relating to registration with 
Selective Service). 
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as political outsiders, not full members of the political community, whose 
values are “inherently hostile” to traditional American values. 
B.  Legal Analysis of the Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment 
Litigation and (Lack of) Similar Lawsuits 
In his lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma, Muneer Awad raised 
claims under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.68  
He claimed that the SOS Amendment affected him as a Muslim citizen of 
Oklahoma for two distinct sets of reasons.  First, he asserted that the 
amendment constituted an official governmental disapproval of his religion 
and was therefore unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.69  
Second, he asserted that the amendment would directly affect the validity of 
both his will and his marriage, both of which invoked “sharia law.”70  The 
courts, in considering Mr. Awad’s claims on the merits, also had to render 
decisions on threshold issues such as ripeness and standing.71 
Though the courts ultimately ruled in Mr. Awad’s favor on all legal 
issues raised in the case, it is the court’s holding on the issue of standing 
that is perhaps the most interesting.  In ruling that Mr. Awad’s non-
economic injuries were sufficient to confer standing upon him, the court 
held the following: 
Like the plaintiffs who challenged the highway crosses in American 
Atheists, Mr. Awad suffers a form of “personal and unwelcome contact” 
with an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution that would target his 
religion for disfavored treatment.  As a Muslim and citizen of 
Oklahoma, Mr. Awad is “directly affected by the law[ ]. . . .”72 
This language, on the issue of standing, goes to the heart of the harm 
of the anti-Shariah movement.  The critical harm is the political 
marginalization of the American Muslim community—the official message 
                                                                                                     
 68. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 69. Id. at 1119. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ripeness was an issue in the case because Mr. Awad initiated legal action after the 
voters of Oklahoma had approved the amendment—but, importantly, before the amendment 
actually went into effect.  Standing became an issue in the case because the state argued that, 
because Mr. Awad’s injuries were non-economic in nature, those injuries were insufficient 
to confer standing. 
 72. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1122. 
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from American Muslims’ own government that they are not “full members 
of the political community.”73 
This language, from the highest court to rule on the Oklahoma SOS 
Amendment, is particularly interesting when conducting a strategic analysis 
of “anti-Shariah” bill litigation.  The Oklahoma litigation was the first 
lawsuit directly opposing anti-Shariah legislation and has been the only 
such lawsuit as of the date of the submission of this article.  The Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which employed Mr. Awad at the 
time the lawsuit was initiated, has launched a far-reaching legislative and 
public education campaign against these bills—but has never initiated legal 
action against any of the bills passed into law in other states.  In addition, 
no other legal organization, including CAIR’s co-counsel in the Oklahoma 
litigation, has challenged “anti-Shariah” legislation in any other state.  The 
SOS Amendment litigation was successful at every level, every contested 
hearing, and on every legal issue raised.  However, to date, it has been the 
only litigation on this issue. 
 C.  Legal Analysis of the “Facially Neutral” American Laws for American 
Courts Legislation 
As the author of this article, I am also employed by CAIR and I have 
also advocated against “anti-Shariah” legislation, an ALAC bill introduced 
in Pennsylvania, both through media and public education campaigns and 
through direct legislative advocacy.  Furthermore, I have benefited from the 
knowledge and experience of other CAIR chapters, and CAIR-National, 
while engaging in these efforts. 
What has fascinated me during this process is the extent to which 
CAIR (and, presumably, other opponents of “anti-Shariah” legislation, 
including its co-counsel in the Oklahoma legislation) has seemingly bought 
into the APPA’s stated belief that “facially neutral” ALAC bills are 
immune from constitutional scrutiny.   
Litigation was initiated in Oklahoma for two reasons: (1) because 
Oklahoma was a state in which “anti-Shariah” legislation passed which also 
had a CAIR chapter in the state, and (2) because Oklahoma was a state in 
which CAIR found a plaintiff, Mr. Awad, who would be directly affected if 
courts could not consider “Shariah law.”  This direct effect would occur 
because Mr. Awad, rather unusually for an American Muslim, had both a 
marriage and a will that directly invoked “Shariah law.”  CAIR was 
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specifically looking for a plaintiff who could assert such a direct effect, 
presumably because it believed that “anti-Shariah” legislation could only be 
successfully challenged in a court of law if it directly effected individuals’ 
ability to practice their faith. 
Therefore, when the facially neutral ALAC bill was introduced in 
Pennsylvania, many of my colleagues (including persons, associated with 
both CAIR and its co-counsel, who were involved in the Awad litigation) 
expressed concerns that the facially neutral ALAC legislation could not 
support an effective constitutional challenge. However, if my legal analysis 
is correct, the new facially neutral “anti-Shariah” bills are not immune from 
constitutional challenge simply because they fail to produce plaintiffs who 
experience a “direct effect” upon their ability to practice their faith.  If the 
bills are unconstitutional because they label Muslims as political outsiders, 
as not full members of the political community, then this labeling process 
violates the Establishment Clause as understood through the “endorsement 
test.”  This labeling process would adversely affect all Muslims, regardless 
of an individual’s degree of religiosity or religious observance, because the 
label would attach to all persons who are identified as “adherents of the 
disfavored religion.” 
Therefore, notwithstanding the apparent consensus between the “anti-
Shariah” movement’s proponents and opponents, I contend that the 
“facially neutral” ALAC legislation is unconstitutional for the exact same 
reasons as Oklahoma’s SOS amendment.  As noted in Lukumi Babalu 
Aye,74 when determining whether a bill was enacted with discriminatory 
purpose, “[f]acial neutrality is not determinative.” Courts may consider 
extrinsic evidence of discriminatory purpose and is not limited to the plain 
text of the statute.  As described above, there is ample evidence of ALAC’s 
intended purpose to target “Shariah law” and the adherents of that faith.  In 
fact, the APPA has made no secret of its intended purpose.  And, it is this 
purpose—the intention to convey a governmental “disapproval” of the 
Islamic faith and to communicate to American Muslims that they are 
“outsiders, not full members of the political community—which renders 
ALAC unconstitutional. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
It is possible that this Conclusion should be more appropriately named 
an Epilogue.  The research contained in this article was orally presented at a 
symposium at Washington & Lee University School of Law on February 
15, 2013.  However, shortly before the submission of this article—on April 
19, 2013, to be exact—a new chapter was written on the status of the 
ALAC movement.  On that date, ALAC legislation was signed into law in 
Oklahoma.  The APPA bragged on its website, in a post published that 
same date, that the facially neutral ALAC which had just passed into law 
possessed none of the constitutional vulnerabilities that the SOS 
Amendment had possessed—all while simultaneously acknowledging that 
the facially neutral ALAC legislation had the exact same intended purpose 
as the SOS Amendment. 
It will be interesting to see what will become of this new ALAC bill in 
Oklahoma.  To date, both CAIR and its co-counsel in the SOS litigation 
have seemingly agreed with the APPA regarding the legal significance of 
ALAC’s facial neutrality.  Following the enactment of the Oklahoma 
ALAC bill, CAIR told an interviewer at the Huffington Post:  “These bills 
don’t have any real-world effect. Their only purpose is to allow people to 
vilify Islam,” said Corey Saylor, CAIR’s legislative affairs director, of the 
more recent bills.75  However, the same Huffington Post article also opined, 
“The new bills, however, are more vague and mention only foreign laws, 
with no references to Shariah or Islam . . . All of that makes them harder to 
challenge as a violation of religious freedom.”76 
The question I would like to leave the reader with, at the end of this 
article, is not whether opinion stated in this Huffington Post article  is 
correct—I have already posited to you that it is not.  My question is 
whether any litigants, or their counsel, will rise to the challenge of 
contesting these bills in court?  This is a rhetorical question, of course, but 
one which deserves to be asked.  Because the APPA, Yerushalmi, and other 
proponents of the “anti-Shariah” movement have demonstrated no intention 
to surrender.  In fact, they have displayed a remarkable audacity to admit to 
using legal trickery in an effort to circumvent constitutional law (the 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause) while simultaneously 
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achieving its stated goal of passing admittedly discrimnatory anti-Muslim 
violation. 
The question is whether anyone else will have the necessary audacity 
to try to stop them. 
